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The legal order of papal elections had long been governed by the tradi-
tions of early Christian communities. There had been no clear and bind-
ing rules stipulating the election steps and handling any disputes. As in 
many other areas of Church life, appropriate legislation was adopted as 
a defensive reaction to negative features – corruption, intrigue, power 
struggles, etc. The first legal framework for the selection of the Roman 
Bishop therefore came into existence quite late, at the very end of the 
5th century. In 499, a synod assembled in Rome. In light of the demean-
ing squabbles during the previous year’s papal election,2 it felt a need 
to set binding rules stipulating the course of subsequent papal elections. 
The synod adopted provisions to prevent the election from becoming a 
power clash. It decided that as long as the legitimate Pope is alive no 
negotiations concerning his successor may be held. The candidate who 
objectively collected the most votes was to become the Pope.3 Further-
more, it was allowed that the governing Pope could determine or rec-
ommend his successor. Finally, it was clearly established that if the 
Pope did not determine his successor, it was up to the Roman clergy to 
elect him.4 
In the following centuries, details of the papal election were 
modified in various ways; however, a basic and fundamental legal rule 
was still missing. Basically, the principle was applied of electing a new 
bishop through the decision of the church community (clergy and the 
people) with the respective metropolitan and neighboring bishops re-
taining their rights (e.g. of approval and ordination). Because of the 
                                            
1 This article has been published as a part of the research project The Czech Science 
Foundation (GACR) GP401/09/P128 The right of exclusion and the possibilities to influ-
ence of papal elections. 
2 After the death of Pope Anastasius II in 498, two candidates were elected – Symmachus 
and Lawrence. The election was evidently decided by bribes, clashes between influential 
groups of the city notables and private interests of the clergy. 
3 It was this provision in particular that was undoubtedly a reaction to the fact that Gothic 
rulers in Ravenna had begun to actively support different factions, thus indirectly claim-
ing the determination of a suitable candidate. 
4 A synodal document presents G. D. MANSI, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima 
collection, Vol. 8: Anni 492–536, Graz 1960, p. 229. See also L. LECTOR, Le Conclave. 
Origines, histoire, organisation, législation ancienne et moderne, Paris 1894, pp. 20–21; 
H. J. WURM, Die Papstwahl. Ihre Geschichte und  Gebräuche ,  Köln  1902,  pp .  
11–12;  L .  GAUGUSCH, Das Rechtsinstitut der Papstwahl, Wien 1905, pp. 9–10. 
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specific position of Rome and its symbolic significance for Christian 
society, additional legal bands were applied at the same time, whether 
general (Justinian’s legislation) or bilateral (treaties with Carolingian 
and Ottonian rulers), which complemented the election with the “su-
pervision” and “protection” of the secular power. So if we want to 
place papal elections on firm legal foundations, we have to go as far 
back as the beginning of the High Middle Ages. Election legislation, 
the crucial elements of which have remained valid until the present day, 
stands on three main pillars that need to be clearly defined. The legal 
order of papal elections followed three fundamental provisions – the In 
nomine Domini decree of 1059 and the constitutions Licet de vitanda of 
1179 and Ubi periculum of 1274. 
 
In nomine Domini (1059) 
 
Background 
Pope Nicholas II’s reform in 1059 can undoubtedly be considered a 
fundamental shift in the legal stipulation of papal elections. The Roman 
Church was just going through its first truly fruitful period of bloom, 
filled with a reformative atmosphere. Through the interventions of Em-
peror Henry III, who was dominant but favourable to changing Church 
practices, popes coming from the German part of the Empire succeeded 
in Rome. Among them, Pope Leo IX stood out, having taken funda-
mental personnel steps regarding the composition of the Roman eccle-
siastical hierarchy, and invited many reformers into his circle. Roman 
aristocracy had to retreat, which made it possible to establish a trend of 
purposeful reforms.5 
 The sudden death of Henry III and regency rule for his minor 
successor, Henry IV, significantly affected the plans of Church reform-
ers. Regent Empress Agnes continued to show her support for the Ro-
man Church, but her real power was decreasing and there was an acute 
danger that Roman nobility would again seize control of the highest 
levels of papal policy. In this uncertain situation, reformers around 
Leo’s successor Nicholas II decided to take a crucial step that was to 
prevent secular interventions in selecting the head of the Roman 
Church in the future. In order to maintain control over papal elections, 
they intentionally reduced the circle of electors to a group of people 
that the reform supporters could actually control. The previous policy 
                                            
5 The issue of accession and activity of the German popes is analyzed in the 
study by G. FRECH, Die deutschen Päpste – Kontinuität und Wandel, in: S. WEIN-
FURTER (Ed.), Die Salier un das Reich, Vol. 2, Sigmaringen 1991, pp. 303–332. 
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of personnel control of the most important bishop positions around 
Rome thus came to full fruition. 
The change was based on shifting the main part of the election proce-
dure to cardinal-bishops, that is, bishops of major dioceses in the sur-
roundings of Rome, beyond the immediate influence of Roman noble 
families. This was the first visible shift from the previous bureaucratic, 
chiefly lay structures of the papal office toward Pope-linked high cler-
ics, who were supposed to take over control of the Church within the 
reform intentions. Up to then, cardinals were primarily assigned liturgi-
cal functions; cardinal-bishops managed suburban dioceses, cardinal-
priests performed mass functions in the Basilica of St. John Lateran and 
other titular churches, and cardinal-deacons transformed into a collegi-
um of palace deacons led by an archdeacon, with their number increas-
ing from 7 to 12 as the city expanded. So three groups of cardinal or-
ders (ordines) formed, gradually assuming a leading position in the 
papal administration. Previous leading bureaucrats changed more to 
judicial clerks in nature even though the actual functions were pre-
served.6 
 
Content 
The Papal Election Decree came into existence at the Roman synod on 
13th April 1059. Two main versions of the document have been pre-
served – one through the papal office and the other one from imperial 
production; the papal (or Roman) version being considered genuine. 
The text of the Decree is divided in nine sections, with the first six sec-
tions representing the core and the remaining ones stipulating criminal 
sanctions for the breach of the previous provisions. 
The substance of the document contains several basic theses. 
The primary one consists in narrowing the group of electors to include 
so-called suburbicarian bishops, that is, cardinal-bishops from sur-
rounding Roman dioceses. In reality, seven bishoprics obtained this 
privilege; however, the number was not fixed and was subject to partial 
changes. Generally, bishops in Albano, Porto, Ostia, Palestrina, Tusculum, 
                                            
6 Basic information on the administration of the papal office is provided by B. SCHIM-
MELPFENNIG, Das Papsttum. Grundzüge seiner Geschichte von der Antike bis zur 
Renaissance, Darmstadt 1984, pp. 69–70, 92–93, 154–155. For the development of the 
College of Cardinals in the 11th century and its relation to Roman Church structures, 
compare in particular M. FOIS, Papa e cardinali nel secolo XI, in: Archivum Historiae 
Pontificiae 14, 1976, pp. 383–416; H.-W. KLEWITZ, Die Entstehung des Kardinalkolle-
giums, in: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Kanonistische Abteilung 
(hereinafter ZRG KA) 25, 1936, pp. 115–221; R. HÜLS, Kardinäle, Klerus und Kirchen 
Roms: 1049–1130, Tübingen 1977. 
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Sabina and Silva Candida could be called electors.7 After the bishops 
agreed on a candidate, they were supposed to invite the rest of the so-
called clerical cardinals (priests and deacons). Finally, the remaining 
Roman clergy and people were to vote, completing the process of se-
lecting the new Roman bishop. The document expressly emphasizes the 
leading role of cardinal-bishops, who decided on the candidate; the oth-
er participants were “merely” supposed to follow them.8 
 The Decree could not avoid the issue of the powers of the impe-
rial administration, which until then had played a crucial role in the 
selection of the new Pope. Even the reformers did not dare to complete-
ly disregard the Emperor’s influence, and it probably was not their 
main objective. Nicholas wanted to get rid of the interventions of the 
Roman aristocracy, for which he needed effective help from the Em-
peror. The document therefore expressly mentions the maintenance of 
duly respect to Henry IV, as well as his rights after becoming Emperor. 
It also does not seem that this was an attempt to limit the election ap-
proval only to Henry IV, in case he reached coronation as Emperor. 
The text talks about loyalty to imperial rights belonging to Henry’s 
predecessors and successors as well.9 
 The third part of the document protects the election against po-
tential obstructions by the Roman aristocracy. First, it expressly admits 
the possibility of electing a non-Roman, although it considers it optimal 
that a member of the Roman Church stands at the top. In case it was 
difficult or impossible for the election to be held in Rome, cardinal-
bishops could carry it out at another suitable place, after inviting the 
other election participants. However, it is obvious from the wording of 
the text that the election would have been valid even if it were only the 
bishops gathered outside of the city who agreed on a suitable candi-
                                            
7 The last named dissolved over time, because the town was abandoned by its citizens due 
to adverse living conditions. Its place was taken by Segni for some time; later, the posi-
tion was mostly left unfilled 
8 An analysis of the causes of the rise of cardinal-bishops is presented by D. HÄGER-
MANN, Das Papsttum am Vorabend des Investiturstreits. Stephan IX. (1057–1058), 
Benedikt X. (1058) und Nikolaus II. (1058–1061), Stuttgart 2008,  pp .  111–119,  and  
D.  JASPER, Das Papstwahldekret von 1059. Überlieferung und Textgestalt, Sigmarin-
gen 1986, pp. 110–111. 
9 Salvo debito honore et reverentia dilecti filii nostri Henrici, qui inpraesentiarum Rex 
habetur et futurus Imperator deo concedente speratur, sicut iam sibi concessimus et suc-
cessoribus illius, qui ab hac apostolica sede personaliter hoc ius impetraverint (§ 4). For 
more about extent and validity of the imperial rights after the edition of  Decree ,  see  
W.  STÜRNER, Salvo debito honore et reverentia. Der Königsparagraph im Papst-
wahldekret von 1059, in: ZKG KA 54, 1968, pp. 1–56; H. GRUNDMANN, Der Kö-
nigsparagraph im Papstwahldekret von 1059, in: Studi Gregoriani 9, 1972, pp. 37–52. 
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date.10 The last element divesting Roman aristocracy of its influence in 
the election was the provision that the selected candidate did not have 
to achieve enthronement and coronation in order for the election to be 
valid and for him to serve the pontificate.11 So after being elected, he 
also immediately acquires the right of disposal over all property of the 
Roman Church. 
 
Effect and assessment 
The effect of the papal decree In nomine Domini caused an earthquake 
in the Church. There were no doubts, whom it was targeted against, 
namely Roman noble families that traditionally shared power influence 
in the city. However, the reformers were entering shaky ground, con-
sidering that Pope Nicholas II could only be elected with direct support 
from Empress Agnes.12 The papacy indisputably counted on effective 
cooperation with the empire in the future. The subsequent sharp con-
flict in the Investiture Controversy was a product of ambitions of the 
two main actors, Gregory VII and Henry IV, as well as of a confronta-
tion of two guiding principles of Christendom. 
 When assessing the document, it is important to realize that 
some consequences of the Decree only emerged subsequently and per-
haps incidentally. In addition to the emphasis that gradually turned 
against the Empire’s interventions, we can also mention the papacy’s 
loosening its close ties to the Roman environment. The possibility of 
holding elections outside of Rome, as well as the fact that bishops of 
surrounding towns became electors, meant that the Pope was really be-
coming the universal head of the Church. The subsequent clashes of re-
formist popes with antipopes paradoxically only confirmed this “separation” 
                                            
10 Quodsi pravorum atque iniquorum hominum ita perversitas invaluerit, ut pura 
simncera atque gratuita electio fieri in Urbe non possit, cardinales episcopi cum religi-
osis clericis catholicisque laicis, licet paucis, ius potestatis obtineant eligere apostolicae 
sedis pontificem, ubi gongruentius iudicaverint. § 5. 
11 Plane postquam electio fuerit facta, si bellica tempestas, vel qualiscunque hominum 
conatus malignitatis studio restiterit, ut is qui electus est in apostolica sede iuxta consue-
tudinem intronizari non valeat, electus tamen sicut papa auctoritatem obtineat regendi 
sanctam Romanam ecclesiam et disponendi omnes facultates illius, quod beatum Grego-
rium ante consecrationem suam fecisse cognoscimus. § 6. 
12 After Nicholas II was elected by the reformist party, the Roman aristocracy nominated 
Antipope Benedict X. Reformers had a hard time negotiating support from the Empire. 
Agreement was only reached after several months, and Nicholas entered Rome. However, 
he certainly wouldn’t have achieved anything without the help of Bishop Gilbert 
of Ravenna, an Italian chancellor who represented the Emperor’s interests. For more on 
the election of Nicholas II, see J. WOLLASCH, Die Wahl des Papstes Nikolaus  I I ,  
in :  G .  TELLENBACH, Adel und Kirche. Festschrift, Freiburg 1968, pp. 205–220. 
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from Rome. Antipope Clement III, in particular, who held the Eternal 
City for many years at the end of the 11th century, forced Urban II to 
move his activities to northern Italy and southern France, beyond the 
sphere of influence of the Emperor and Roman nobility. It is therefore 
very important to carefully judge the motivation and intentions of the 
Decree formulations. Nevertheless, it undeniably became a foundation 
for subsequent papal elections and, through the victory of the Gregorian 
Reform, also a model of how to proceed.13 
 
Licet de evitanda discordia (1179) 
 
Background 
In the 12th century, the Gregorian Reform ideas were significantly con-
solidated, and most concepts of the Catholic Church transformation 
were implemented. Popes managed to free themselves from the influ-
ence of Roman-German rulers and develop a centralized form of the 
Roman Curia. Despite these successes, several important issues re-
mained unresolved in the area of papal elections. The weak points 
clearly showed in the course of some elections, which disunited the 
Catholic Church and weakened its readiness for action. The problems 
were only resolved in the late 1170’s, when Pope Alexander III ended a 
long-lasting conflict with Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa. 
 The Pope faced two main problems. First was the ambiguous 
provision on the number or quality of votes a papal candidate had to 
obtain in the election in order to be legitimately elected. The election of 
1130, as well as events of 1159, became important precedents. In the 
case of the former, after Pope Honorius II died, two electoral assem-
blies took place on the same day, 14th February. The first, consisting of 
a smaller group of cardinals, elected Innocent II, while the second, tak-
ing place later but consisting of a significantly higher number of elec-
tors, elected Anacletus II. The result was an eight-year schism that di-
vided the Church into two camps, enabling the intervention of secular 
authorities. The result of the two pretenders’ fight was also questiona-
ble in terms of law, because Innocent II won with the help of Emperor 
                                            
13 The election decree of 1059 enjoyed considerable attention from church historians. Among 
many monographs and partial studies, we can mention, for example, H.-G. KRAUS, Das 
Papstwahldekret von 1059 und seine Rolle im Investiturstreit, Rom 1960; F. KEMPF, 
Pier Damiani und das Papstwahldekret von 1059, in: Archivum Historiae Pontificiae 2, 
1964, pp. 73–89; D. HÄGERMANN, Untersuchungen zum Papstwahldekret von 1059, 
in: ZRG KA 87, 1970, pp. 157–193; W. ULLMANN, Zum Papstwahldekret von 1059, in: 
ZRG KA 99, 1982, pp. 32–51. 
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Lothair III and the powerful regulars, St. Bernard of Clairvaux and St. 
Norbert.14 
 The second Papal Schism was also based on a dual election by 
cardinals on the same day, 7th September 1159. This time, the man with 
the higher number of votes – Alexander III – succeeded, but he had to 
undergo exhausting battles to do so.15 Antipope Victor IV was backed 
by the powerful Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, who also shielded 
Victor’s successors Paschal III and Callixtus III. Pope Alexander had to 
go into exile in France, accepted numerous compromises and in 1160 
faced an assembly of West European prelates in Toulouse, who were to 
decide his fate. It is therefore not surprising that he intended to defini-
tively end the indecorous situation in the Church that left room for sec-
ular power interventions.16 
 Another problem that Alexander wanted to resolve was the 
mutual relations of the cardinal ordines (bishop – priest – deacon) to 
elections, as well as final clarification of previous contractual agree-
ments on the elections between the Pope and Emperor. 
 
Content 
The constitution Licet de evitanda discordia was adopted at the Third 
Council of the Lateran in 1179. Attendants of the Council sessions 
were quite united, with Pope Alexander III enjoying his recognized 
authority as the winner in fights with the Empire. Debate on the docu-
ment proposal therefore did not encounter any significant difficulties. 
The core of the document stipulates the number of votes neces-
sary for a candidate to be pronounced the elected Pope. Until then, this 
question had not been defined clearly and with binding effect, and the 
required “majority” of votes could have been interpreted in different 
ways.17 According to some canonists, the sounder part of votes (sanior 
                                            
14 Circumstances of the divided election of 1130 were discussed in a number  of  
works ;  A.  KELLER, Machtpolitik im Mittelalter – Das Schisma von 1130 und Lothar 
III. Fakten und Forschungsaspekte, Hamburg 2003; F.-J. SCHMALE, Studien zum 
Schisma des Jahres 1130, Köln, Graz 1961; W. MALECZEK, Das Kardinalskollegium 
unter Innocenz II. und Anaklet II, in: Archivum Historiae Pontificiae 19, 1981, pp. 27–78 
can be mentioned as one of the most significant ones. 
15 As for the election, see W. MADERTONER, Die zwiespältige Papstwahl des Jahres 
1159, Wien 1978. 
16 For negotiations between Alexander III and Frederick I Barbarossa, see F. OPLL, 
Fridrich Barbarossa. Císař a rytíř, Praha, Litomyšl 2001, pp. 231–245. 
17 The question of majority had only been stipulated by the old legislation of 499 by Pope 
Symmachus I. This so-called first election law determined that a candidate who objec-
tively gained the largest number of votes was to become the Pope. 
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pars) was sufficient to get elected,18 which were particularly the votes 
of cardinal-bishops pursuant to provisions of the 1059 election decree 
by Nicholas II. However, beginning in the mid-11th century a signifi-
cant shift occurred, and holders of lower cardinal ranks (priests and 
deacons) also influenced papal policy to a considerable degree. The 
Pope ended this conflict by stipulating that only a candidate who had 
obtained two-thirds of the valid submitted votes could be considered a 
legitimately elected pope. If a minority candidate wanted to claim this 
title, then he and his supporters had to expect automatic excommunica-
tion. However, this punishment also applied to a candidate who 
achieved a majority of votes but without the required two-thirds quor-
um.19 
Another important element was the fact that the text made no 
mention of the potential rights of the Emperor. All legal actions in the 
election depended on cardinals’ decisions, while the ruler lost any abil-
ity to prevent the elected candidate from accession, by requiring his 
confirmation in office, for example. A precedent for Alexander’s ac-
tions had already been set by the Concordat of Worms, which supposed 
no interventions in the papal life. And even though the Worms privi-
lege of 1122, stipulating the issue of bishop investiture, did not apply 
directly to papal elections, the Pope too, as a Roman bishop, could de-
duce from that his right to a free canonical election.20 
 
Effect and assessment 
Alexander prevented further disputes over the number of votes and damp-
ened disagreements between cardinals. The election decree In nomine 
Domini partially based the priority of cardinal-bishops on the metropoli-
tans’ jurisdiction over the appointment of bishops, supported by Church 
tradition. Since no metropolitan was available in Rome, it was logically 
                                            
18 The “sanior pars” principle is analyzed in a study by B. SCHIMMELPFENNIG, Das 
Prinzip des „sanior pars“ bei Bischofswahlen im Mittelalter, in: Concilium 16, 1980, pp. 
473–477. 
19 Si quis autem de tertiae partis nominatione confisus, quia de ratione esse non potest, 
sibi nomen episcopi usurpaverit, tam ipse, quam ii, qui eum receperint, excommunicatio-
ni subiaceant, et totius sacri ordinis privatione mulctentur ita, ut viatici etiam eis, nisi 
tantum in ultimis, communio denegetur, et si non resipuerint, cum Dathan et Abiron, 
quos terra vivos absorbuit, accipiant portionem. Canon No. 1 of The Third Lateran 
Council. 
20 Commentary by W. PLÖCHL, Geschichte des Kirchenrechts, Vol. 3, München 1970, 
pp. 116–123, H. APPELT, Die Papstwahlordnung des III. Laterankonzils (1179), in: 
Ecclesia peregrinans. Festschrift J. LENZENWEGER, Wien 1986, pp. 95–102. 
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the surrounding bishops who took his place.21 However, since the role of 
cardinals had been so fundamentally reinforced, it was inconceivable to 
leave all decisive election powers in the hands of a narrow group of epis-
copal cardinals. The Gregorian Reform transferred the Church executive 
apparatus into the hands of the high-ranking Church hierarchy, endowing 
cardinals with extensive powers.22 The Pope therefore only eliminated 
boundaries between episcopal and clerical cardinals that were created by 
Nicholas II’s decree in rather wide and ambiguous terms.23 In a sense, it 
was the emancipation of cardinals that became a precondition for the for-
mation of a real college of cardinals. There were no longer individual car-
dinals but rather an authoritative group at the head of the Church body that 
had been increasingly asserting itself since the late 12th century.24 
The legislation was detailed in the 1245 decree Qui frequenter by 
Pope Innocent IV. It stipulated that the required two-thirds majority could 
not include the vote of a cardinal who had himself obtained the required 
number of votes (he thus could not vote for himself). Furthermore, it de-
termined that a cardinal who left the election lost the opportunity to partic-
ipate again in the selection of a new Pope. On the other hand, cardinals 
close to the Pope were not allowed to abuse their position and commence 
the election after his death without duly waiting for the arrival of their 
colleagues. These amendments indicated that there was some tension 
about the exact timing of the start of the election following the Pope’s 
death. 
 
Ubi periculum (1274) 
 
Background 
The third legal foundation for the selection of the head of the Catholic 
Church, the constitution Ubi periculum, was in many respects crucial 
                                            
21 „Quia sedes apostolica cunctis in orbe terrarum prefertur ecclesiis, atque ideo super 
se metropolitanum habere non potest, cardinales episcopi procul dubio metropolitani 
vice funguntur, qui videlicet electum antistitem ad apostolici columnis apicem 
provehant.“ The Decree In nomine Domini, § 3. 
22 The power of lower cardinal ordines had been increasing since as early as the end of 
the 11th century, and ultimately after 1130. This fact is pointed out by HÄGERMANN, p. 
120, among others. 
23 The decree stipulated that after the cardinal-bishops had voted, the remaining cardinals 
were to be “invited” to the election, which terminologically did not pose any significant 
problem in the emancipation of lower cardinal orders („...inprimis cardinales episcopi 
diligentissima simul consideratione tractantes mox sibi clericos cardinales adhibeant.“ 
The Decree In nomine Domini, § 1). 
24 W. REINHARD, Glaube und Macht. Kirche und Politik im Zeitalter der Konfessiona-
lisierung, Freiburg 2004, p. 43. 
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for the practical execution of the election. Its origination is inherently 
connected with the disgraceful course of the papal election in Viterbo 
between 1268 and 1271. Unreasonable protraction of the election, also 
associated with the cardinals’ intrigues, arguments and pursuit of mate-
rial benefit, disgusted a considerable portion of the Catholic episcopate 
and other segments of society. The elected Pope Gregory X took ad-
vantage of the turbulent atmosphere. As someone standing outside of 
the life and interests of the Roman Curia, he did not consider the partial 
interests of the College of Cardinals and decided to fundamentally 
change the course of all elections to come. 
The Pope was facing one principal problem – how to overcome 
the expected opposition of the College of Cardinals. Enforcing the 
changes through a general assembly of the Church, namely at a Council 
(the Second Council of Lyon, 1274), seemed to be the best way. The 
energetic Pope also proved to be an excellent strategist. He did not in-
clude the issue of a new arrangement for papal elections in the planned 
Council agenda, stating only a general need for Church reform, in addi-
tion to discussions about a crusade and a union of the churches. It is 
therefore not quite clear whether details of the planned legal stipulation 
had been thoroughly discussed in the Pope’s immediate circle before 
being published. Available sources clearly show that the election re-
form project took all participants aback, and it was the element of sur-
prise that helped break down the resistance of the College of Cardinals. 
A decision on ending the Council sessions on a definite date, 9th July 
1274, proved to be an important element as well. Even though the Pope 
could undoubtedly have postponed the Council’s end date, the short 
time period eliminated delays and potential negotiations of the opposi-
tion against the proposal.25 
It was only on 7th July 1274 that the Council Fathers learned 
about the planned modifications, after Gregory X addressed the Council 
with the need to deal promptly with imperfections of the papal elec-
tions. His appeal immediately gained wide support from the assembly, 
because disgust over the last election still persisted. In order to prevent 
the surprised cardinals from beginning any defensive action against the 
constitution’s approval, he negotiated from the outset mainly with low-
er-ranking prelates, i.e., metropolitans and their suffragan bishops. Pru-
dently securing the spontaneous enthusiasm of “regular” bishops for 
tightening the course of papal elections, the Pope drew up several cop-
                                            
25 Basic and detailed information on the Second Council of Lyon is presented by B. ROB-
ERG, Das Zweite Konzil von Lyon (1274), Paderborn 1990. For most information of the 
constitution Ubi periculum, see ibidem, pp. 293–309. 
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ies of the change proposal that he handed out to the assembled prelates. 
Those preliminarily agreeing with the provisions could attach their 
name to the document – writing it in the initial intitulation and subse-
quently confirming their decision by attaching a seal. With some exag-
geration, this non-standard procedure may be called democratic and, in 
a sense, took into account tendencies that were to surface more than 
100 years later within conciliarism. However, here it was undoubtedly 
a tactical element of bypassing the College of Cardinals, which would 
not have accepted the limitation of its authority without reservations.26 
Gregory’s organizational skills celebrated absolute success. The 
vast majority of Council Fathers already espoused the document in the 
preliminary consent stage. Cardinals negotiated backstage and certainly 
won some individual bishops to their side but were not able to surpass 
the required majority of votes. After presenting the document, the Pope 
additionally made the assembled bishops take an oath not to disclose 
their position, which left the cardinals in the dark about the final result. 
So the crucial constitution on papal elections came into existence in a 
somewhat non-standard way and with the help of lower components of 
the Catholic hierarchy. 
 
Content 
 The key element of the adopted constitution was the formal in-
troduction of the institute of a closed electoral assembly in which the 
present cardinals chose a new head of the Catholic Church. The docu-
ment wording insisted on quite strict conditions regarding technical and 
material equipment – all electors were to remain in one room, hermeti-
cally closed off from the surrounding world and only equipped with 
one window for the delivery of food and beverages. If agreement on the 
next Pope was not reached quickly (within three days), the conditions 
toughened even more, i.e., one meal for lunch and dinner, and after 
another five days food was reduced to only bread, wine and water. An-
other article, which divested the cardinals for the duration of the elec-
tion of control over revenues from properties they managed thanks to 
their office, was also supposed to contribute to a prompt election. 
 Another part of the regulation focused on autonomy, independ-
ence and minimal outside influence on the selection. For one thing, it 
was not possible to significantly delay the beginning of the election and 
thus gain room for negotiations with secular authorities – the constitu-
tion determined that the election had to commence ten days after the 
                                            
26 Ibidem, pp. 302–303. 
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beginning of sede vacante at the place where the Pope died.27 The secu-
lar authority of the conclave venue assumed responsibility for the elec-
tion premises being closed and safe.28 It was therefore not possible to 
leave the conclave premises at will, but only in case of justified cir-
cumstances, most commonly illness.29 However, the constitution also 
directly and openly insisted on preserving the free selection of the new 
Pope, declaring on principle all previous provisions and agreements on 
potential candidates invalid and non-binding.30 If an elector attempted 
to carry the content of the session outside of the conclave premises or 
communicate with an outside person (receiving or sending a letter or 
messenger), he could expect very strict penalties, the ultimate one be-
ing excommunication.31 
 
Effect and assessment 
 The motivation for drawing up the Ubi periculum constitution 
seems obvious. Primarily, it was supposed to prevent long and intrigue-
filled elections where each cardinal pursued his own interests instead of 
the Church’s welfare. Technical limitations also aimed at a prompt be-
ginning of the election, without delays caused by the need to wait for 
all members of the College. Another and, in terms of our topic of secu-
lar power interventions in the election process, more significant mo-
ment was the emphasis on free canonical elections. By introducing a 
closed conclave, secular authorities lost the ability to immediately in-
fluence cardinals’ decision-making, both at its beginning and during its 
course. 
 The latter element mentioned above clearly reflects the changing 
situation during the 12th and 13th centuries. National monarchies were 
gradually being constituted, and through their influence, the composi-
tion of the College of Cardinals also changed. Political interests and 
animosities spread among Church hierarchy elites and influenced the 
                                            
27 Only in case of insurmountable difficulties preventing elections from taking place in 
the town (e.g., interdict on the town, unwillingness of the municipal authorities to accept 
elections on their territory, etc.) was it possible to move the election to the nearest suita-
ble town. The election was then supposed to be held in the Bishop’s palace or a suitable 
monastery, after the interiors had been adjusted, of course. 
28 The conclave “guardian” undertook, under oath and with awareness of possible sanc-
tions, to perform the above-mentioned duties. 
29 The constitution allowed the cardinal to return if his health improved. 
30 In particular, the provision explicitly declared the legal ineffectiveness of all written 
contracts and obligations – at the beginning and in the course of the election, each cardi-
nal had to have his hands free to choose a candidate solely for his qualities. 
31 Text of the constitution in: Zweites Konzil von Lyon. Ubi periculum, in: Dekrete der 
ökumenischen Konzilien, Vol. 2, pp. 314–318. 
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selection of the head of the Catholic Church. Gregory X tried to reverse 
this trend and remind cardinals what their motivation in papal elections 
was supposed to be. Since he had no illusions about the cardinals’ 
compliance with mere appeals or admonishments, he set up technical 
conditions so strict and clear that they were very hard to get around. If 
all the constitution’s articles had been fulfilled, the election procedure 
would have remained to a large degree in the hands of the Church. 32 
 However, the problem of the constitution lay in the circum-
stances under which it came into existence. Gregory X’s actions can be 
considered extraordinarily successful in terms of organization, but in 
order for such a fundamental legal regulation to be viable, he also 
needed to convince those who were affected by it, namely the cardinals, 
of its necessity. After Gregory X died, the subsequent conclave fol-
lowed the new legal regulation (Pope Innocent V was elected after just 
a one-day session in 1276), but the dissatisfaction of the College of 
Cardinals was growing. The next Pope, Adrian V, yielded to the pres-
sure and suspended its effect. However, since he died before issuing an 
official constitution, his plan was only completed by his successor John 
XXI, who removed Gregory’s legislation with the decree Licet felicis 
recordationis.33 On the other hand, the elimination of regulatory mech-
anisms re-opened doors to all the previous disorders. Over the next 20 
years, the Catholic Church elites agreed that returning to the prudent 
provisions of Gregory X was the only chance for improvement. In Oc-
tober 1294, Pope Celestine V brought the constitution back in effect, 
and his successor Boniface VIII completed the work, establishing the 
constitution firmly in the Catholic Church’s legal order by including it 
in the Church legislation Liber sextus.34 
 
Abstract 
The subject of this study is the legal order´s analysis of papal elections 
in the Middle Age. The author concentrates on three fundamental pro-
visions – the In nomine Domini decree of 1059 and the constitutions 
Licet de vitanda of 1179 and Ubi periculum of 1274. The presented 
                                            
32 For ana lys is  and commentary  on the decree , see ROBERG, pp .  293–309 and  
B. ROBERG, Der konziliare Wortlaut des Konkleve-Dekrets „Ubi periculum“ von 1274, 
in: AHC 2, 1970, pp. 231–262. See also LECTOR, pp. 91–95; WURM 38–39; GAUGUSCH 
90–92; M. WALSH, The Conclave. A Sometimes Secret and Occasionally Bloody History 
of Papal Elections, Norwich 2003, pp. 85–87. 
33 Reasons for revoking provisions of the constitution included the hard living conditions 
within the conclave, which unreasonably strained the older and infirm cardinals (there 
was even talk about deaths). 
34 See LECTOR, pp. 95–99; WALSH, p. 91. 
Drahomír Suchánek  
Historical and Legal Milestones of Medieval Papal Elections 
 
40 
analysis of the electoral legislation includes as the legal aspects, so his-
torical context and implications for the further development of papal 
elections. The considerable attention is paid to the complicated relati-
onship between papacy and College of Cardinals, whose role in the 
electoral process grew steadily. 
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